Dans son discours à la nation au sujet de la fin de la guerre en Irak, Barack Obama a mis énormément d’emphase sur le fait que cette guerre a été la source de déficits qui ont fragilisé l’économie américaine.  Il va de soi que cette analyse a été reprise en cœur par les médias québécois (ici, ici & ici).

S’il est vrai que le coût de la guerre en Irak a été astronomique, il serait bon de mettre ces chiffres en perspective.  Voici la valeur des déficits des États-Unis avec et sans la guerre en Irak:

La guerre en Irak a coûté 709 milliards de dollars alors que les déficits, depuis 2003, s’élèvent à 4 731 milliards de dollars.  En bref, durant cette période, la guerre en Irak a représenté 15% des déficits aux États-Unis.  Toujours durant cette période, la guerre en Irak a représenté 2,3% des dépenses totales du gouvernement…  À lui seul, le déficit de l’année 2009 de l’Administration Obama est presque 2 fois plus élevé que le coût total de la guerre en Irak.

Il est aussi ironique d’entendre des keynésiens affirmer que la guerre en Irak a ruiné l’économie américaine puisque selon la doctrine keynésienne, les guerres sont des stimuli économiques !

Source:

The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update

Les États-Unis sont maintenant en Irak depuis 6 ans. Le bilan ?

Pour certains, l’intervention américaine en Irak est un crime de guerre. Si seulement tous les « crimes de guerre » avait un dénouement aussi positif…

Certains journalistes n'apprendront jamais.  C'est le cas de Richard Hétu qui, depuis son retour, multiplie les gaffes.

Jeudi dernier, le "collaborateur spécial" a publié un billet dans lequel il affirme que 50% des faillites personnelles aux États-Unis sont liées à des soins de santé impayés.  Si Richard Hétu avait fait son travail convenablement, il aurait découvert que les chiffres publiés dans le magazine Time sont erronés.

Hier, le pitoyable journaliste a publié un billet faisant l'apologie de Chas Freeman, le candidat pressenti par Barack Obama pour diriger le "National Intelligence Council", l'organisme qui coordonne le travail des 16 agences de renseignement américain.

Si Richard Hétu avait fait son travail convenablement, il aurait découvert que Chas Freeman a déjà déclaré qu'un conflit ethnique en Irak était impossible parce que les différences entre sunnites et chiites n'étaient pas assez importantes.

Durant la campagne électorale, Richard Hétu avait aussi dénoncé la présence d'un lobbyiste pro-saoudien dans l'entourage du sénateur McCain.  Il convient de rappeler que Chas Freeman était payé par l'Arabie Saoudite pour faire du lobbyisme à Washington.

Pour couronner le tout, Chas Freeman, qui a déjà été ambassadeur en Chine, a dit que les autorités chinoises avaient fait preuve de trop de retenu lors de la répression des manifestations de la place Tian'anmen.

Si Bush avait fait une pareille nomination pour le "National Intelligence Council", Richard Hétu aurait accusé, avec raison, le président républicain d'être un incompétent.  Mais le partial journaliste a plutôt décidé de défendre l'indéfendable parce que Chas Freeman ne porte pas Israël dans son coeur et parce qu'il a été nommé par Obama.

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Si Wall Street est en déroute, c'est tout le contraire en Irak. En début de semaine, l'indice ISX de la Bourse de Bagdad a progressé de 8,39% ce qui a permis d'inscrire un nouveau record pour le plus haut sommet jamais atteint par l’ISX. Le secteur le plus dynamique de la Bourse de Bagdad ? Les banques !

Source:

ISX index hits record high

"Don’t hold your breath waiting for Barack Obama to end the war on terror."

Think Again: Barack Obama and the War on Terror
By David M. Edelstein, Ronald R. Krebs 

"Obama Will End the War on Terror"

Don't bet on it. A misconceived "war on terror" has stoked Americans' nightmares since Sept. 11, 2001, and that will in all likelihood continue. Despite having anointed himself the candidate of change, Barack Obama remained wedded to crucial elements of the war on terror throughout his campaign. Not only did he embrace the term, but, like the Bush administration, he portrayed the 9/11 attacks as a turning point in global politics, suggested that transnational terrorism threatened the United States' survival, depicted the tactic of terrorism as the enemy, and laid out an apocalyptic vision of "the next attack." The danger of terrorism was, he declared, "no less grave" than that posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

This portrayal was more than campaign rhetoric. The war on terror has been the country's defining national security narrative since 9/11, and politicians across the political spectrum have paid obeisance to it. Indeed, shortly after the election, Obama portrayed the attacks in Mumbai as evidence of "the grave and urgent threat of terrorism" that the United States faces, as if the perpetrators of that tragedy were necessarily members of a global terrorist brotherhood. Introducing his national security team a few days later, he highlighted the threat posed by a poorly specified "terror" that "cannot be contained by borders," rather than by specific U.S. adversaries who would use terrorist tactics.

As president, Obama will be hard-pressed to jettison the war on terror. His administration's foreign policy will look different from that of its predecessor in many respects, but not this one. With Obama in the Oval Office, the United States seems likely to remain in the war on terror's thrall — to the detriment of the country's priorities, its foreign policy, the tenor of its discourse, and perhaps its people's liberties. Obama promised to lead America on a new path, but deviating from the course set in the past seven years will not be easy.

"Obama Will Wage the ‘Battle of Ideas' Better Than George W. Bush"

Doubtful. Yes, Obama, by his presence and personality, has changed the atmospherics of U.S. foreign relations. America's reputation around the world has for some time been at a nadir, so there is nowhere to go but up. But the United States' poor image abroad has not been the result of a marketing failure, and, thus, better public diplomacy will not lead to victory in the "Battle of Ideas." Anti-Americanism thrives, not because others misunderstand the United States, but because they perceive its aims and tactics all too well. The Bush administration's greatest perceived foreign-policy failures — Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantánamo, unimpeded global warming — could not have been overcome with better public diplomacy, and recent improvements in trans-Atlantic relations cannot be credited to an improved sales pitch. The world is rightly waiting to see if Obama will match his words with actions. Public diplomacy can matter only at the margins.

As much as he might wish it, Obama does not enter the Oval Office with a clean slate. The sizable U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the aggressive hunt for al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan's tribal areas, will continue to rankle in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Elsewhere, criticism of U.S. foreign policy predated Bush — the French expressed alarm at American "hyperpower" during the "good old days" of Clintonian multilateralism — and will persist after he leaves office. Notwithstanding the financial meltdown and U.S. travails in Iraq, the United States remains the world's largest economic and military power by far. Its penchant for pursuing its global interests unilaterally lies at the root of many others' suspicions, and there will be times that even an Obama administration will chafe at and throw off any self-imposed shackles. When that happens, those high-flying expectations will come crashing back to earth.

"Withdrawing from Iraq Will Bring Victory Closer in Afghanistan"

Wishful thinking. Sure, getting out of Iraq will in principle make available U.S. soldiers and materiel, but don't expect these additional resources to pay large dividends in Afghanistan.

First, insurgent fighters enjoy a safe haven in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan, and it is not for lack of U.S. firepower or troops in Afghanistan that they operate freely. The Pakistani government's reluctance and inability to bring the region to heel is the chief problem, and a reduced U.S. commitment to Iraq will not make that political nut easier to crack. Second, even if the security situation were to improve thanks to more U.S. troops and money, the challenge of governing Afghanistan's ethnically diverse and geographically challenging landscape will remain. Third, all this presumes that the United States has the political will to undertake and sustain a much more substantial long-term military presence in Afghanistan, and such political will — if it ever existed — is now at best a wasting asset.

Americans were ready to bring the troops home from Iraq even before the recession intensified the usual guns-versus-butter debates. The budget crunch has prompted calls for slashing military spending, and many will see in the troop drawdown in Iraq an opportunity to free funds to aid Americans at home — not an opportunity to redouble U.S. commitment to Afghanistan.

"Ending the War in Iraq Will Help the Fight Against Terrorism"

Not really. A U.S. pullout from Iraq would, on its face, redress a grievance held not only by al Qaeda, but by many Muslims. Al Qaeda, however, found reason to target the United States and its interests before Iraq, and many of those reasons remain — from U.S. support for Arab regimes perceived as illegitimate, to the U.S. role in the festering Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to the grand religiopolitical vision of reestablishing the caliphate. Iraq was an unusual recruiting boon, but al Qaeda and its affiliates have no shortage of justifications for continued violence, and some of these reasons remain highly resonant in the Muslim world.

Liberals sometimes argue that because the war in Iraq became a rallying cry for Islamist terrorist groups, drawing thousands into the fold, its end will dry up the pool of recruits. But the ardor of those converted by Iraq will not quickly cool, and the war's memory will continue to inspire would-be terrorists for the foreseeable future. Conservatives sometimes argue that the country's terrorist enemies will take heart at even a gradual U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and undertake a new wave of mass-casualty attacks. But it is hard to imagine that America's adversaries will be any more emboldened by the withdrawal from Iraq than they were by the United States' flailing and failures there.

Most fundamentally, the United States has found itself the victim of terrorism because it is so strong and its adversaries are so weak. That will not change soon, and terrorist tactics will continue to appeal to America's enemies — less because they are especially bloodthirsty or immoral (though they may be), than because, given the imbalance of power, more conventional tactics don't promise the same payoff.

"Capturing Osama bin Laden Should Be a Top Priority"

Not now. As a candidate, Obama pledged that he would capture or kill Osama bin Laden if he were elected president. This pledge was good politics, but it does not make for an effective counterterrorism strategy. Although the capture or death of bin Laden would be welcome, the U.S. military and intelligence community have better ways to spend their time and money.

Eliminating bin Laden would undoubtedly please Americans, boost Obama's ratings, and undermine morale within al Qaeda. But al Qaeda has recovered, perhaps substantially, from the beating it took immediately after 9/11, and the death of its leader is unlikely to be devastating. It is a resilient organization: Dozens of high-ranking al Qaeda officials have been killed or captured since 2001, but they were eventually, and often swiftly, replaced. And beware what one wishes for: A younger, more energetic, equally charismatic, and more organizationally skilled leader might take bin Laden's place.

The benefits of capturing or killing bin Laden are likely to be short-lived, and the intelligence and military assets diverted to the task could be better used elsewhere. Rather than devote resources to hunting bin Laden, the Obama administration should instead target both the instability off which violent Islamism feeds and the local organizations, usually affiliated only loosely with al Qaeda, that have more often been responsible than al Qaeda itself for the terrorist attacks carried out since 9/11.

Americans' ramped-up expectations about the war on terror are exceeded only by the challenges the Obama administration will face. The politics of the war on terror have the potential to upset the Obama administration's priorities, but the economic crisis offers an opportunity to right America's foreign policy and consign the war on terror to its proper place. In this sense, the economic crisis, as Obama's Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel has suggested, would be a terrible thing to waste.

David M. Edelstein is assistant professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the department of government at Georgetown University, and a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Ronald R. Krebs is associate professor in the political science department at the University of Minnesota.

Pour ceux qui doutent encore du succès du « surge » et de la victoire de la démocratie en Irak:

Dire que Barack Obama était contre le « surge »…

Avec plus de 12 millions de visionnements, voici quel a été le vidéo politique le plus populaire sur You Tube durant la campagne présidentielle:

Voici les pertes civiles et militaires en Irak depuis l'intervention américaine:

En 2002, sous Saddam Hussein, il y avait 0 télévision, 0 radio et 0 journal indépendant.  L'indice de liberté de la presse était de 79,00 (100 étant le pire) selon Reporters Sans Frontière.  Aujourd'hui, il y a en Irak 54 stations de télévision, 114 stations de radio et 268 journaux indépendants. L'indice de liberté de la presse est passé à 59,38.

Sous Saddam Hussein, il y avait 833 000 personnes disposant d'un téléphone.  Aujourd'hui, ils sont 13 360 000.

Sous Saddam Hussein, il y avait 4 500 personnes disposant d'une connexion internet.  Aujourd'hui, ils sont 261 000.

Sous Saddam Hussein, le pays produisait 95 000 mégawatts/heure d'électricité. Aujourd'hui, le pays produit 112 960 mégawatts/heure.

Source:

Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq

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Une idée reçue qui circule à gauche veut que les États-Unis aient armé Saddam Hussein… De 1979 à 2002, période durant laquelle Saddam a été au pouvoir, seulement 0,6% de l'arsenal irakien provenait des États-Unis. Les pays qui ont le plus vendu d'armes à l'Irak sont: l'URSS (60,6%), la Chine (14.7%) et… la France (14,5%).

Source:

Importer/Exporter TIV Tables

Hier matin, le magazine allemand "Der Speigel" a publié une bombe: selon l'hebdomadaire, le premier ministre irakien Nouri al-Maliki a donné son appui au plan de Barack Obama de retrait des troupes d'Irak.  Toute la journée, les médias ont abondamment commenté cette nouvelle, mon pote Richard Hétu a consacré non pas un, mais deux billets à l'affaire.

Immédiatement, j'ai trouvé cette histoire louche et j'avais raison !

Iraqi PM disputes report on withdrawal plan

A German magazine quoted Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki as saying that he backed a proposal by presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Sen. Barack Obama to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq within 16 months.  [...]

But a spokesman for al-Maliki said his remarks "were misunderstood, mistranslated and not conveyed accurately."

Government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said the possibility of troop withdrawal was based on the continuance of security improvements, echoing statements that the White House made Friday after a meeting between al-Maliki and U.S. President Bush.

Coup de propagande du "Der Speigel" ?

Si les médias ont été très généreux dans leur couverture du supposé appui d'al-Maliki au "plan Obama", parions que la dénonciation du travail bâclé de "Der Speigel" par le gouvernement irakien aura un traitement beaucoup plus humble…

Un documentaire produit par l’équipe de McCain sur les flip-flops d’Obama relatif à la guerre en Irak:

Obama est vraiment le candidat du « changement », il change d’opinions toutes les semaines…

Une mise à jour de la situation en Irak:

Victimes Civiles

Violences ethniques et sectaires

Mais ça, les médias n'en parle pas…

La promesse de Barack Obama de retirer les troupes d’Irak advenant son élection: bullshit !

Mais Richard Hétu préfère la job de cheerleader à celle du journaliste sérieux rapportant les faits nécessaires à la compréhension des enjeux électoraux.

"But dive into Rockefeller's report, in search of where exactly President Bush lied about what his intelligence agencies were telling him about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, and you may be surprised by what you find."

'Bush Lied'? If Only It Were That Simple.

Search the Internet for "Bush Lied" products, and you will find sites that offer more than a thousand designs. The basic "Bush Lied, People Died" bumper sticker is only the beginning.

Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV (D-W.Va.), chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, set out to provide the official foundation for what has become not only a thriving business but, more important, an article of faith among millions of Americans. And in releasing a committee report Thursday, he claimed to have accomplished his mission, though he did not use the L-word.

"In making the case for war, the administration repeatedly presented intelligence as fact when it was unsubstantiated, contradicted or even nonexistent," he said.

There's no question that the administration, and particularly Vice President Cheney, spoke with too much certainty at times and failed to anticipate or prepare the American people for the enormous undertaking in Iraq.

But dive into Rockefeller's report, in search of where exactly President Bush lied about what his intelligence agencies were telling him about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, and you may be surprised by what you find.

On Iraq's nuclear weapons program? The president's statements "were generally substantiated by intelligence community estimates."

On biological weapons, production capability and those infamous mobile laboratories? The president's statements "were substantiated by intelligence information."

On chemical weapons, then? "Substantiated by intelligence information."

On weapons of mass destruction overall (a separate section of the intelligence committee report)? "Generally substantiated by intelligence information." Delivery vehicles such as ballistic missiles? "Generally substantiated by available intelligence." Unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to deliver WMDs? "Generally substantiated by intelligence information."

As you read through the report, you begin to think maybe you've mistakenly picked up the minority dissent. But, no, this is the Rockefeller indictment. So, you think, the smoking gun must appear in the section on Bush's claims about Saddam Hussein's alleged ties to terrorism.

But statements regarding Iraq's support for terrorist groups other than al-Qaeda "were substantiated by intelligence information." Statements that Iraq provided safe haven for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other terrorists with ties to al-Qaeda "were substantiated by the intelligence assessments," and statements regarding Iraq's contacts with al-Qaeda "were substantiated by intelligence information." The report is left to complain about "implications" and statements that "left the impression" that those contacts led to substantive Iraqi cooperation.

In the report's final section, the committee takes issue with Bush's statements about Saddam Hussein's intentions and what the future might have held. But was that really a question of misrepresenting intelligence, or was it a question of judgment that politicians are expected to make?

After all, it was not Bush, but Rockefeller, who said in October 2002: "There has been some debate over how 'imminent' a threat Iraq poses. I do believe Iraq poses an imminent threat. I also believe after September 11, that question is increasingly outdated. . . . To insist on further evidence could put some of our fellow Americans at risk. Can we afford to take that chance? I do not think we can."

Rockefeller was reminded of that statement by the committee's vice chairman, Sen. Christopher S. Bond (R-Mo.), who with three other Republican senators filed a minority dissent that includes many other such statements from Democratic senators who had access to the intelligence reports that Bush read. The dissenters assert that they were cut out of the report's preparation, allowing for a great deal of skewing and partisanship, but that even so, "the reports essentially validate what we have been saying all along: that policymakers' statements were substantiated by the intelligence."

Why does it matter, at this late date? The Rockefeller report will not cause a spike in "Bush Lied" mug sales, and the Bond dissent will not lead anyone to scrape the "Bush Lied" bumper sticker off his or her car.

But the phony "Bush lied" story line distracts from the biggest prewar failure: the fact that so much of the intelligence upon which Bush and Rockefeller and everyone else relied turned out to be tragically, catastrophically wrong.

And it trivializes a double dilemma that President Bill Clinton faced before Bush and that President Obama or McCain may well face after: when to act on a threat in the inevitable absence of perfect intelligence and how to mobilize popular support for such action, if deemed essential for national security, in a democracy that will always, and rightly, be reluctant.

For the next president, it may be Iran's nuclear program, or al-Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan, or, more likely, some potential horror that today no one even imagines. When that time comes, there will be plenty of warnings to heed from the Iraq experience, without the need to fictionalize more.

Je suis toujours amusé par les gens qui prétendent que la guerre en Irak a été motivée par le pétrole. Selon ces gens, les compagnies pétrolières seraient assez puissantes pour avoir forcé l'invasion de l'Irak par les États-Unis.

Pourtant aux États-Unis, il existe de nombreuses zones pétrolières où l'exploitation est interdite:

Les pétrolières américaines seraient assez puissantes pour déclencher une guerre à l'autre bout du monde, mais pas assez influentes pour venir à bout des lobbys écologistes.

Laissez-moi rire…

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Contrairement aux idées reçues véhiculées dans les médias, depuis 2001 le terrorisme n'a pas augmenté mais diminué. Entre 2001 et 2007, le nombre de civils tués par des actes terroristes à reculé de 40%. L'an dernier en Irak, le recul a été de 55%. Ce déclin spectaculaire est attribué au "surge" de George Bush en Irak ce qui a entrainé l'effondrement d'Al-Qaeda.

Source:

Human Security Brief 2007